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CONSTITUTIONAL
THE FROTHINGHAm

LAW-STANDING TO SUE: WHAT

REMAINs

OF

RuLE?-Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 10, 1968, the Supreme Court held in Flast v. Cohen,1
that a federal taxpayer had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a congressional appropriation when the challenge was
grounded on a specific constitutional
limitation of the Congressional
2
power to tax and spend.
The plaintiffs, whose standing to sue was premised solely on the
ground that they were citizens and taxpayers of the United States,
alleged that the establishment of religion clause was being violated
by expenditures of federal funds under Titles I and II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. 3 Funds were being
appropriated under the Education Act "to finance instruction of
reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools, and to
purchase textbooks and other instructional materials for use in
such schools." 4 The Government had moved in the district court to
have the complaint dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to maintain the action. 5 The Government's allegation was premised on the rule announced by the Supreme Court
over four decades ago in Frothinghar v. Mellon.6 In Frothingham
the Court determined that a federal taxpayer did not have standing
to challenge a Congressional appropriation because his portion of
the expenditure "is comparatively minute and indeterminable ...
[so that] . .. no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive
powers of a court of equity." 7 The district court noted that the
Frothinghamopinion provided "powerful" support for the Government's contention. 8 However, the court believed that the issue of
standing presented by these plaintiffs was of such great importance
that a three-judge court should be convened to decide the question. 9
1 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
2 It is the purpose of this article to establish that there exists no other

specific constitutional limitation on the powers of Congress to tax and
spend than the religious provisions of the first amendment. But see
82 HARV. L. REv. 95, 224-231 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 82 HARV.
L. REv.].
3 79 Stat. 27 (1965).
4 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85-6 (1968).
5 Flast v. Gardner, 267 F. Supp. 351 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).
6 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
7 Id. at 453.
8 Flast v. Gardner, 267 F. Supp. 351, 354 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).
9 Id. at 355.

CASENOTES
The three-judge court, with Judge Frankel dissenting, 0 held
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because the district court
was bound to follow the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Frothingham.11 The plaintiffs made a direct appeal of the decision to the
Supreme Court under the appropriate provision of the judicial
code. 12 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.$
After determining that the three-judge court had been properly
convened, 14 the Court was faced with the problem of determining
"whether Frothinghamestablished a constitutional bar to taxpayer
suits or whether the Court was simply imposing a rule of selfrestraint which was not constitutionally compelled."'15 However, in
order to determine the answer to that all-important question, the
Court first had to determine what was meant by the term standing,
a term which the Court called "one of 'the most amorphous
[concepts] in the entire domain of public law.' 16
The Court concluded that the concept of standing was an integral part of the doctrine of justiciability. The Court further concluded that the doctrine of justiciability placed both a constitutional
and a non-constitutional limitation on the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. The constitutional barrier is the requirement of article Ii,
section 2 that federal courts only render opinions where the issues
are presented in the form of a "case or controversy". The Court
interpreted this clause of the Constitution to mean that: "Federal
judicial power is limited to those disputes which confine federal
courts to a role consistent with a system of separated powers and
which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through
10 Judge Frankel had written the decision which granted the plaintiffs
the three-judge court to decide the issue of standing.
11 Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
12 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 a direct appeal may be made to the Supreme
Court from a district court "... from an order granting or denying...
an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or
proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges."
-3 389 U.S. 895 (1967).
14 The Government contended that the three-judge court had been improperly impaneled for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs, only wanted
to enjoin the operation of practices of the New York City School
Board and 28 U.S.C. § 2282 requires that a plaintiff must seek to enjoin
the entire statutory scheme before a three-judge court can be called.
Second, a three-judge court should not have been convened because
appellants questioned not the constitutionality of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 but only its administration.
35 392 U.S. at 92.

16 Id. at 99.
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the judicial process."'1 7 The non-constitutional barrier is the selfimposed rule that the Court will avoid prematurely passing on
constitutional questions.' The Court had, thus, determined that
the doctrine of justiciability was "a blend of constitutional requirements and policy considerations;"'19 a short-hand expression for
all the various reasons why cases sought to be adjudicated in federal
courts have been held to be non-justiciable. Aside from standing,
the Court stated that "no justiciable controversy is presented when
the parties seek adjudication of only a political question, when the
parties are asking for an advisory opinion . . . [9r] when the
question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent
-20
developments ....
Based upon these conclusions, the Court was able to determine
that the requirement that the plaintiff must have standing to sue
focused upon the party who was bringing the action and not, as
with the other requirements of the doctrine of justiciability, on the
issues to be adjudicated. In other words, standing pertained to the
problem of whether the plaintiff was the proper party to request
an adjudication of a particular issue, not whether the issue itself
was justiciable. The Court explained this distinction between
standing and the other facets of the doctrine of justiciability by
stating that while the plaintiff may be the proper party to bring
the action, there may exist other grounds which concern the
justiciability of the issues presented, such as political question, upon
which a court could properly determine that the plaintiff's case was
non-justiciable. The Court verbalized this position by stating that:
The "gist of the question of standing" is whether the party seeking
relief has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."'21
Premised on this analysis of the concept of standing, the Court
concluded that the question of whether the plaintiff was the proper
party to maintain the action, did not of itself, "raise separation of
powers problems related to improper judicial interference in areas
Id. at 97,
See Mr. Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936), for an excellent discussion of the development of rules by the Supreme Court, whereby the Court refuses to
pass upon the merits of a case which is confessedly within its jurisdiction.
19 392 U.S. at 97.
20 Id. at 95.
21 Id. at 99. (emphasis added).
17

18

CASENOTES
committed to other branches of the Federal Government. '22 If such
a problem were to arise at all, it would be only because of the issues
the plaintiff sought to have adjudicated.2 Thus, the only constitutional barrier which standing places on the jurisdiction of the
federal courts is concerned with whether the dispute sought to be
adjudicated will be "presented in an adversary context and in a
form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the
judicial process. '24 Viewed in this context, Frothingham must be
thought of as an articulation of a policy that federal taxpayers are
not the proper party to challenge the constitutionality of federal
expenditures because they do not have a great enough personal
stake in the outcome of the case to guarantee that the issues presented for the Court's determination will be those thought to be
capable of resolution through the judicial process. The present
Court, however, refused to agree with such a policy. It believed
that under certain conditions, 25 "a taxpayer may have the requisite
personal stake in the outcome. .,"26 to make him the proper party
to sue. The question which the Court then had to answer is when
does a taxpayer possess such a personal stake?
The Court established two requirements which a taxpayer must
meet before his status as a taxpayer would make him the proper
party to challenge the constitutionality of a Congressional appropriation. First, the taxpayer must establish a logical connection
between his status as a taxpayer and the type of legislative enactment attacked. The Court, therefore, concluded that a taxpayer
would be the proper party to challenge the unconstitutionality of
Congressional legislation where Congress' power to act is based
on the taxing and spending clause "rather than an incidental
expenditure in the administration of an essentially regulatory
22

28

Id. at 100.

It should, however, be noted that the doctrine of separation of powers
may to some degree influence a court's determination as to whether
or not the plaintiff has standing to sue. If it clearly appears that the

issues presented for the court's determination are non-justiciable, a
court may confuse the criteria which the Supreme Court has established in Flast for the determination of standing. See note 21, supra,
and accompanying text. Such a court might, then, hold that the
plaintiff does not have standing when what is really meant is that the
issues presented by the plaintiff are non-justiciable.
24 392 U.S. at 95.
25 As an example of a situation in which a taxpayer would have standing
to sue, the Court stated that if Congress provided funds for the construction of churches for particular sects, it is obvious that a taxpayer
would have standing to sue to enjoin the expenditure of federal funds
for such a blatantly religious purpose.
28 392 U.S. at 101.
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statute ....-27 Second, the Court required that the taxpayer must
establish a nexus between the first requirement and the precise
nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. This requirement,
the Court concluded, forced the taxpayer to prove:
...that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional
limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing
and spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8.28
The Court then applied this standard to the facts of the case at
hand and determined that the plaintiffs had satisfied both requirements. First, their challenge was against a Congressional exercise
of power under article I, section 8. Second, the challenge was
premised on the establishment clause which was enacted to provide
that the federal government would be completely secular, and
must, thus, be considered to operate ".... as a specific constitutional
limitation upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending
power conferred by Art. I, § 8."-9
The Court then attempted to establish that Flast was distinguishable from Frothinghar. It pointed out that in Frothingham
the taxpayer's claim had not been based on a violation of a specific
constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending power, of
Congress. Instead, it was premised on the allegation that Congress
had exceeded the general powers delegated to it by article I, section
8 by enacting the Maternity Act of 1921.30 However, the Court
while attempting to distinguish the two cases, stated a proposition
which is apparently incorrect:
[W]hether the Constitution contains other specific limitations
[on the Congressional power to tax and spend other than the
religious provisions of the first amendment] can be determined
only in the context of future cases. However, whenever such
specific limitations are found, we believe a taxpayer will have
clear stake as a taxpayer in assuring that they are not breached
by Congress.31
It is the contention of the author of this article that there exists
no other specific limitation on the Congressional power to tax and
spend than the first clause of the first amendment. In other words,
a federal taxpayer qua taxpayer has standing to challenge a Congressional appropriation only when the alleged unconstitutionality
of an expenditure is premised on a violation of the religious pro82 H v.L. REv., supra note 2, at 229-30.
392 U.S. at 102-3.
29 Id. at 104.
80 42 Stat. 224 (1921).
31 392 U.S. at 105.
27
28

CASENOTES
visions of the first amendment.3 2 This proposition is based upon the
conclusion that the religious provisions of the Constitution are
preferred rights.83 They are so preferred that when they are
alleged as being violated the taxpayer, merely alleging such a
contention, has presented a dispute which will guarantee that
"....

the constitutional challenge will be made in a form tradition-

ally thought to be capable of judicial resolution."3 4

An argument theoretically could be put forward that the second
clause of the first amendment concerned with freedom of speech
and press is just as preferred 5 as is the first clause concerned with
religious freedoms, so that a taxpayer would have standing to
challenge a Congressional appropriation which violates freedom
of speech and press. This allegation is incorrect. The Supreme
Court has maintained that no law may be passed by a state or the
federal government which breaches the wall between church and
state.3 6 However, the Court has not been as strict with its interpretation of the Government's right to abridge a citizen's freedom of
speech and press. In fact, Mr. Justice Douglas maintains that the
words in the first amendment, "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging freedom of speech" have been interpreted by his brethern
on the Court to mean: "Congress may make some laws that
32

But see Henkin, The Supreme Court: 1967 Term-Foreward,82 HAnv.
L. REv. 63, 72-76 (1968), suggesting that there exists no other specific
limitation on the Congressional power to tax and spend than that
such spending must provide for the general welfare. However a
student commentator writing in the same edition of the Harvard Law
Review, 82 HAav. L. REv., supra note 2, states that there exists other
specific constitutional limitations on the congressional power to tax
and spend than the religious provisions of the first amendment. A
taxpayer, though, will not be accorded standing to challenge such
federal expenditure, unless he can show ".. . that the particular taxing
power abuse proscribed by the provision was historically feared as a

significant instrument of majoritarian oppression. . ." Id. at 231.
33 Mr. Justice Douglas has suggested that the religious provisions of

the first amendment hold a dominant position in the myriad of rights
granted to us by the Constitution. Thus, when alleging such rights,
the requirements of standing are satisfied merely because such rights
are alleged as being violated. Douglas, The Bill of Rights Is Not
Enough, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 206, 226-27 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Douglas].
34 392 U.S. at 106.
35 In Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949): Mr. Justice Reed speaks
of
36

". .

. the preferred position of freedom of speech in a society that

cherishes liberty.. .. "
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See note 69, infra,
and accompanying text.
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abridge freedom of speech. '37 Thus the second clause of the first
amendment is not as preferred as the first so that even if the
situation arose where a taxpayer could be considered as the proper
38
party to challenge a violation of the freedom of speech, it is
doubted that the Court would consider that the issues presented for
adjudication were presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.
It should be noted that the Flast exception is not a new doctrine.
The foundation for it was laid almost seventy years ago by the
40
39
Supreme Court's ruling in Bradfteld v. Roberts. In Roberts, the
Douglas, supra note 33, at 217. A good example of the fact that
freedom of speech is a conditional right is Mr. Justice Holmes' statement in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), that even "[tihe
most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.... (freedom of
speech) does not even protect a man from an injunction against
uttering words that may have all the effects of force. The question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent." Id. at 55. (emphasis added).
38 Violations of one's freedom of speech normally arise when the
defendant in a criminal action alleges that the law which he is charged
with breaking abridges his freedom of speech. Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951). Thus it is doubtful that an alleged violation of
freedom of speech would ever arise pursuant to an enactment by
Congress under the powers granted to it by the taxing and spending
clause. As noted above the first requirement which a taxpayer must
meet before he may be considered to have standing is that the legislation which is alleged to be unconstitutional must have been enacted
pursuant to the taxing and spending power of Congress, not merely
an appropriation pursuant to a regulatory enactment. See note 27,
supra, and accompanying text.

37

39
40

175 U.S. 291 (1899).

There exists a divergence of opinion as to whether or not Roberts can
be considered as precedent for the proposition stated in this article.
In Frothingham, the Court stated that the case was not applicable
to the problem of federal taxpayer suits because the case involved
a taxpayer attempting to enjoin his municipality. 262 U.S. 447, 454
(1923). Further, a recent student commentator stated that Roberts
was inapplicable to the Flast situation because ". . . the 'wall of
separation' theory of the establishment clause . . . [had not yet] ...

crystalized as judicial norm." 46 TEx. L. REv. 559, 563 n. 26 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as 46 TEx.]. There appears, however, to be just
as convincing authority stating that Roberts is precedent for the
proposition stated in this article. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATVE LAW
TRPxArSE § 22.09 at 243 (1958); Hearings on S. 2907 Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong. 2d Sess., at 65 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
S. 2907].

CASENOTES

appellant brought suit as a citizen and taxpayer of the United States
and a resident of the District of Columbia to prevent the defendant,
the Treasurer of the United States, from making payments to the
Providence Hospital of the District of Columbia. Such payments
were to be made pursuant to an agreement between the hospital
and the Surgeon General of the Army, whereby the Government
was to erect a building on the grounds of the hospital for the care
and treatment of minor contagious diseases. After completion, the
building was to become the property of the hospital, provided twothirds of its beds were reserved for the use of such poor patients
as the Commissioners of the District, in their discretion, sent to the
hospital. The Providence Hospital was a private hospital, staffed
by nurses who were members of the Order of Sisters of Charity,
an order of the Roman Catholic Church. The appellant-taxpayer
thus charged that since the Hospital was run by nuns, it was a
sectarian corporation and that payments by the Government to
such a corporation were in violation of the establishment clause
because public funds were "being used and pledged for the advancement and support of a private and sectarian corporation." 41
However, the Court affimed the decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals that the payments were permissible because the hospital
was "a secular corporation being managed by people who hold to
the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church."42
It should be noted, however, that the Court's decision to affirm
was made on the merits of the issues presented by the parties and
not on the threshold problem of whether the appellant-taxpayer
had the requisite standing to challenge the appropriation.43 Further,
the Court seemed to indicate that if the hospital had been found to
have been a religious corporation, the appellant could have successfully challenged the agreement. Thus, the Roberts case would
appear to be precedent for the proposition that freedom of religion
is one of the most, if not the most, preferred rights granted to the
people of the United States by their Constitution.

41
42
43

175 U.S. at 297.
Id. at 299.
Mr. Justice Peckman began the Court's opinion by stating that the
Court would . .-.
[pass over] the various objections made to the maintenance of this suit on account of the alleged defect of parties, and
also in regard to the character in which the complainant sues, merely
that of a citizen and taxpayer of the United States ..

. ."

and that

the case would be decided on the issue of whether or not the agreement between the Surgeon General and the Hospital violated the
religious provisions of the first amendment. Id. at 295.
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II.

THE PREFERRED RIGHTS DOCTRINE

The belief that there exists a high impregnable wall between
church and state, the slightest breach of which can not be tolerated, 44 is one of the basic pillars upon which our Government is

founded. 45 This belief in a wholly secular form of government was
the basis for the establishment clause.46 Further, even before the
Constitutional Convention was convened, the antagonism against
any linkage between church and state was prevalent among the
Founding Fathers. One of the most illustrative statements of this
desire by the Founding Fathers was the reply by James Madison,
the architect of the first amendment,47 to a tax proposed by the
Virginia Legislature in 1785 which was to provide funds to be paid
to those who taught religion in the public schools. In his reply
known as the Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, Mr. Madison concluded that:
The religion of every man must be left to the conviction and
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to
exercise it as these convictions may dictate. This right is in its
nature an unalienable right.... [Thus], in matters of Religion,
no man's right [may be] abridged by the institution of Civil

Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.48
This belief in a totally secular form of government has persisted
until today.49 As Mr. Justice Black concluded in Everson v. Board
of Education,0 the establishment clause means that:
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See note 68, infra
and accompanying text.
45 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
46 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
47 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968).
48 2 Writings of James Madison 183-84 (Hunt ed. 1910) [hereinafter cited
as Writings of Madison] (emphasis added).
49 The Hearings on S. 2907, supra note 40, at § 85. A bill to provide
judicial review to determine the constitutionality of grants and loans
under acts of Congress, is a good example of the fact that there still
exists, in this nation, a very strong antagonism against any linkage
between church and state. Many prominent lawyers, among them Mr.
Leo Pfeffer, counsel for the plaintiffs in Flast, testified before the
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Judiciary Committee on the merits of S. 2907. Of the many statements made before
the subcommittee concerning the meaning of the religious provisions
of the first amendment, one of the most illustrative of the strong
belief that the Government must be completely neutral in religious
matters was a statement made by the subcommittee's chairman, the
Honorable Sam Ervin Jr. (D-N.C.): "The Founding Fathers intended
to outlaw forever the Congressional appropriation of funds for the
direct or indirect support of any and all religious institutions and
their activities." Hearings on S. 2907, supra note 40, at 4.
50 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
44

CASENOTES
[N]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another No tax in any
amount large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions,whatever they may be called or whatever
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. 51

Thus for the entire life of this nation, the leaders have been preoccupied with the problem of how to maintain a complete neutrality

between government and religion, so preoccupied that the religious
of the Constitution have become known as preferred
provisions
2
rights.5
Mr. Justice Douglas has considered the problem raised by these
so-called preferred rights in relation to a taxpayer's standing to
challenge an alleged violation of them. His conclusion was that:
First amendment rights are by nature of the constitutional
command so preferred that taxpayers should be given standing to
protect them, [but] that the more vague generalized rights of
Due Process involved in other cases require that one who makes
the challenge have a more specific, tangible interest at stake
[before the Court will grant standing]. 53

It is submitted, that the Supreme Court premised its decision in
Flast upon this criteria. The Court speaks in terms of requiring
that a specific constitutional limitation must be alleged before it
can be considered that a taxpayer is the proper party to challenge
the constitutionality of a Congressional expenditure. This is merely

another way of stating that where the religious provisions of the
first amendment are alleged as being violated, the basic obstacle to
a federal taxpayer's standing to sue-the lack of a controversy
thought capable of resolution through the judicial process-is overcome. However, where the taxpayer's claim is an alleged violation
51 Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
52

The fact that the religious provisions of the first amendment have
always been considered as preferred rights is shown by the fact that
even during the period when Frothingham v. Mellon, was considered
as foreclosing all possibility of federal taxpayer suits, many still held
to the conviction that ".

.

. the rulings [of the Supreme Court] show

dramatically how unlikely it is that any significant church-state issue
will be denied a forum on the ground that none of the parties involved
has standing to sue." 111 CONG. REC. 6132 (1965) (remarks of Representative Cellers). Further note the testimony of Mr. Pfeffer before
the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary wherein he stated that ".

.

. never has

the Supreme Court ruled that a first amendment case will be dismissed for lack of standing in line with the reasoning of Frothingham."
Hearingson S. 2907, supra note 40, at 58.
5 Douglas, supra note 33, at 226-27.
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of the Constitution not premised on the religious provisions of the
first amendment, he has not presented issues for the court's deterrination which overcome the limitation which the case or controversy clause places upon the jurisdiction of the federal courts. For
a court to assume jurisdiction over his claim would be "to employ
a federal court as a forum in which to air . . generalized grievances
about the conduct of government ... "1-4
The only explanation for this conflict is that the religious provisions of the first amendment are so preferred in our system of
government that an alleged violation of these rights gives the taxpayer standing to sue even though no greater specific danger to the
taxpayer is shown than that the act allegedly violates these provisions of the Constitution. 5 However, where the alleged violation
of the Constitution is not pursuant to the religious provisions of
the first amendment, the taxpayer will be required to show a
greater personal stake in the outcome of the case, than that Congress in its actions has exceeded the powers granted it by the
Constitution. Only if the taxpayer can show a personal stake can
he be considered as the proper party to challenge the constitutionality of the Congressional appropriation. Further, the only decisions
which have been rendered since Flast v. Cohen that involved the
issue of a taxpayer's standing to sue, Velvel v. Johnson,56 and
Protestantsand Other Americans United v. Watson,57 tend to bolster these conclusions.

54 392 U. S. 83, 106 (1968).

55 Professor Davis has considered this problem in a recent article.

Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 601 (1968).
His conclusion was that the plaintiffs, in Flast and similar situations are modern Madison. For just as Madison thought that an
expenditure of three pence by the Government to religion was too
great, (Writings of Madison, supra note 48, at 186), the present day
Madisons, with the sanction of the Supreme Court, believe that an
expenditure by Congress to aid religious activities which costs each
taxpayer twelve cents (Professor Davis determined that the appropriations in question in the Flast case cost each taxpayer twelve cents,
Id. at 611) is so grave a violation of the constitutional requirement
that our Government be wholly secular that a taxpayer should be
able to enjoin such governmental action.
56 287 F. Supp. 846 (D.Kan. 1968). It should be noted that the presiding
judge was so preoccupied by the problems of political question, that
the issue of standing was not as thoroughly nor as deeply discussed
as it might have been if the suit had not been one that was so
obviously beyond the jurisdiction of the courts because of the issues
presented for determination. See note 23, supra.
57 37 U.S.L.W. 2280 (1968).

CASENOTES
The plaintiff in VelveL was Professor Lawrence K. Velvel of the

University of Kansas Law School who has recently written an

article58 on the possibility of challenging the Vietnamese War in
the courts.5 9 Professor Velvel argued that the United States' presence in Vietnam is unconstitutional because Congress was specific58 Velvel, The War in Vietnam: Unconstitutional,Justiciable,and Juris-

dictionally Attackable, 16 KA_. L. REv. 449 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Velvel].
59 It is not the purpose of this article to become embroiled in the prob-

lems of one's ability to successfully challenge the Vietnamese War
in the courts. Many authors have considered this problem. The most
recent discussion of the topic appears in Schwartz and McCormack,
The Justiciabilityof Legal Objections to the American Military Effort
in Vietnam, 46 TEXA.s L. REv. 1033 (1968). However, the author does
believe that he is compelled to make some perfunctory comments
about standing and the War.
Velvet v. Johnson is similar to cases such as Luftig v. McNamara,
373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967), aff'g 252 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C. 1966), in
that the plaintiff was challenging the constitutionality of the War.
This is not permissible; if not on grounds of standing, then most
certainly on grounds that the issue presented for adjudication is one
of political question. The only possible situation in which a plaintiff
may have standing (his claim may still be barred by political
question) to challenge the present "war" in the Far East is if he
claims that he is a Conscienous Objector to a particular war under the
definition given the term by the Court in United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965). In this situation the plaintiff would be the proper
party to sue since, by basing his claim on the religious provisions of
the first amendment, he has guaranteed that the constitutional issue
will be presented in a form traditionally thought capable of resolution
by the judicial process.
The Court, however, has recently denied certiorari in a case where
the plaintiff claimed that under United States v. Seeger one could
be a Conscienous Objector to a particular war. United States v. Kurki,
255 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Wis. 1966), affd 384 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 926 (1968). On the other hand, the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops, recently held in Washington, D.C.,
has endorsed the argument that a person, on the grounds of conscience,
can be opposed to one war and not to all. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1968, at
18, col. 1. Thus, whether or not the denial of certiorari, which was
rendered before the prelates had spoken, ends the possibility of being
able to be declared a Conscienous Objector to a particular war must
wait now for further consideration by the Supreme Court.
It must be reiterated, though, that conscienous objection to a
particular war is the only possible method by which one may challenge
the war in Vietnam. The approach adopted by Professor Velvel can
not succeed. If the Court were to allow such a claim it would most
assuredly be adopting a position of a super legislature over the other
branches of the Federal Government. This is a stature which the
Founding Fathers did not believe the Court should ever assume.
Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custder?-The School Prayer Cases, in
1963: The Supreme Court Review, (P. Kurland ed. 1963).
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ally given the power to declare war and that the President, without
a declaration of war, is conducting a war against the Vietnamese
people. Professor Velvel argued that he had standing under Flast
because:
Congress, by providing funds to support the

executive's un-

constitutional actions in Vietnam, has violated a specific limitation upon its power to tax and spend (granting money to the
President to declare a war without a declaration of war) and not
simply gone beyond its general powers under Art. I, § 8.60

The United States District Court for the District of Kansas,
however, refused to accept Professor Velvel's argument. 61 Pertaining to standing, the court declared that the plaintiff had not stated
a case within the rule established by Flast. The court concluded
that the plaintiff had failed to present a claim that the court could
consider as one that could be resolved by the judicial process:
Plaintiff asks this Court to determine that a state of war

exists between the United States and the Government of North
Vietnam. This Court has neither the precedent, the capacity, the

facility, nor the inclination to indulge in such an endeavor....

It is not the function of the judiciary to entertain private litigation,
even by a citizen (and taxpayer) which challenges the legality, the
wisdom, or the propriety of the President, as Commander in Chief,
in sending our armed forces
abroad or to any particular region
62
and keeping them there.

60 Velvel, supra note 58, at 503.
61 The court not only refused to agree with Professor Velvel, but what
may be of more importance, the court determined that for a taxpayer
to have standing, the suit must have been brought specifically for the
purpose of challenging a federal taxing or spending program. Further,
the court seems to be implying that the trial judge may look behind
the facts stated in the complaint to determine that the suit was brought
for another purpose, and if it were, he should dismiss it. Such a
holding is incorrect. The court is confusing standing, which is concerned with whether the plaintiff is the proper party to sue, with the
other concepts involved in the doctrine of justiciability, which are

concerned with the nature of the issues presented. A plaintiff may be
the proper party to maintain the suit, but for other reasons the suit
still may not be justiciable. Thus, the fact that the suit was not
brought specifically to challenge the constitutionality of a congressional expenditure, provided the challenged expenditure was enacted
pursuant to the taxing and spending clause, and not as an expenditure
in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute, does not
mean that the plaintiff lacks standing. It may, however, mean that
for other reasons, such as political question, the suit is nonjusticiable.
See United States v. Sisson, 37 U.S.L.W. 2301 (D. Mass. 1968).
62 287 F. Supp. 846, 852-53 (D. Kan. 1968).

CASENOTES
The Federal District Court of Kansas by this decision has
accepted Mr. Justice Douglas' criteria for the determination of
when a federal taxpayer has standing to sue. The court states that
Professor Velvel does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the war because the federal courts are not the proper
place to challenge the wisdom of the actions of a co-equal branch
of the Government. However, the Supreme Court by its decision
in Flast will permit the District Court for the Southern District of
New York to determine the propriety of federal aid to education.
There exists no other reason for the difference in these decisions
except the paramount importance which our society places on
maintaining strict neutrality of government in religious matters.
That the preferred position of the religious provisions of the first
amendment provide the only basis upon which to permit a taxpayer
standing to sue is shown by the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in the Watson case. In that case the
plaintiffs sued to enjoin the then Postmaster General of the United
States, W. Marvin Watson, from issuing a commemorative Christmas postage stamp of allegedly religious character because of its
Madonna motif. The plaintiffs claimed that the issuance of such a
stamp was religious propaganda, thus a violation of the establishment clause. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia had dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to sue under Frothingham v. Mellon. The Court
of Appeals decided to hold its decision in abeyance until after the
Supreme Court had rendered a decision in Flast v. Cohen. However,
once the Court had handed down its decision in Flast,the Court of
Appeals "felt constrained to hold that at least two of the appellants,
possessed the requisite standing
as taxpayers, had shown that they
'63
to challenge the expenditure.
Judge Tamm, writing for the court, stated that the Supreme
Court had held in Flast that the Frothinghamrule was now limited
"... to cases where taxpayers failed to allege a specific constitutional provision restricting an otherwise proper exercise of the
taxing and spending powers of Congress."6 Since in the present
case the taxpayers had alleged that the issuing of the stamps was a
violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment, "they
have made the requisite showing of standing in the light of Flast
and therefore must be given an opportunity to be heard on the
merits." 65 Most importantly the court held that in order to estab63 37 U.S.L.W. 2280 (1968).
64

Id. at 2280.

65 Id. at 2281.
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lish standing, a taxpayer must show that the alleged expenditure
"exceed[ed] the limits imposed by the establishment clause of the
66
first amendment on the taxing and spending powers in Article I."
Thus the court in the Watson case is clearly equating the establishment clause with specific constitutional limitation, and precluding
the possibility that other specific limitations on the power of Congress to tax and spend can be found in the words of the Constitution.
III. NEED FOR UTILIZING THE DOCTRINE
The reason why the Court has now undertaken to grant an
exception to Frothinghamwhich it could have granted many years
ago 67 is the present need to determine the constitutionality of
federal aid to non-secular schools. In the last few years the President, with the approval of Congress, has developed programs of
federal aid to education. These programs included aid to parochial
schools. The question, therefore, arose whether or not federal aid
to such non-secular institutions is constitutional in light of what the
Supreme Court had declared to be the limits of governmental action
within the bounds of the religious provisions of the first amendment
as delineated by decisions where state taxpayers challenged state
appropriations which aided parochial schools as violative of the
first amendment.0 8 The first case where this issue arose was Everson v. Board of Education.6 In Everson the Court ruled that a
New Jersey plan for bussing children to school including those
attending parochial schools was constitutional. The Court, however,
concluded that the religious provision of the first amendment:
. requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups
of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the
state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so
*

66 Id. at 228
67

68

See notes 39-43, supra, and accompanying text.
The most recent case involving the problem of state action which
might violate the religious provisions of the first amendment is
Epperson v. Arkansas, 37 U.S.L.W. 4017 (1968). In this case the Court
held that an Arkansas law which prohibited the teaching of evolution
in public schools was unconstitutional because it was a violation of
both freedom of religion and freedom of speech. Pertaining to the
religious provisions of the first amendment the Court stated that
the "Government in our democracy, state and national, must be
neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice ...
The first amendment mandates governmental neutrality between
religion and nonreligion." Id. at 4019.
See also McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948); Engel

v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); and Abbington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

69 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

CASENOTES
as to handicap religions than it is to favor them .... [Thus] ...
the first amendment has erected a wall between church and state.
That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not
approve the slightest breach.70

Since Everson, then, there has existed a wall betwveen church
and state which neither a state government nor the federal government could violate. While a state or local taxpayer could and often
did challenge local actions as violative of the first amendment, 71 a
federal taxpayer, because of the barrier created by Frothingham,
could not test the constitutionality of a federal enactment which
allegedly violated the first amendment. 7 2 Professor Jaffe called this
situation a "crowning paradox" 73 and concluded that such a disparity must be resolved by the Court. In other words, the Court
was urged to either overrule Everson or Frothingham because of
the inconsistency created by the diverse rulings in these cases.7 4
Some members of Congress tried to save the Court from having
to make that decision; however a bill to provide "for judicial review
to determine the constitutionality of grants or loans (to non-secular
institutions under acts of Congress) ,75 died in committee. The need
to determine whether federal aid to education, which in part was
given to non-secular institutions, breached the wall between church
and state still existed. At this point, however, the only branch of
the Federal Government which could aid those who wanted a
determination of this vital constitutional issue was the Supreme
Court.
Faced with this problem, the Court in Flast decided to "undertake a fresh examination of the limitations upon standing to sue in
a federal court and the application of those limitations to taxpayers
suits." 76 As mentioned above, this investigation lead the Court to

a conclusion which it had reached almost seven decades ago,
namely, that where the taxpayer's challenge is premised on the
Id. at 18. (emphasis added).
71 In fact, on the same day the Court rendered its opinion in Flast it
70

also decided a case involving a challenge to an enactment of the
New York State Legislature which was alleged to violate the religious
provisions of the first amendment because it permitted all school

72
73
74
75

76

children, whether they attended public or parochial schools, to borrow
books at no cost from the state. Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U.S.236 (1968).
Hearingson S. 2907, supra note 40, at 153.
L.

JA=FE,

JuDxcrAL CONTROL OF ADmnsTRAM

AcTCoT

459 (1965).

Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HAv.
L. REv. 1265, 1314 (1961).
Hearings on S. 2907, supra note 40.

392 at 94.
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preferred rights granted him by the religious provision of the first
amendment, he has a great enough personal stake in the outcome of
the suit "to assure that the constitutional challenge will be made
in a form traditionally thought to be capable of judicial resolution."7 7 This is true even though there exists no greater specific
damage to the plaintiff than that the enactment allegedly violates
his rights to have a completely secular government.
Until Congress began appropriating funds to non-secular institutions, as part of the overall program of federal aid to education,
there existed no need to invoke the doctrine of preferred rights.
However, once such programs went into operation, a direct challenge to the most preferred rights granted to the people of the
United States by the Constitution existed. With all other avenues
of settlement to this problem closed, the Supreme Court believed
it had to resolve this challenge to a taxpayer's paramount right to
have his government be completely neutral in religious matters.""
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in Flast v. Cohen is not as broad as it
appears upon first reading. The rule of Frothingham v. Mellon is
as viable today as it was on June 9, 1968. The Court has merely
grafted on to Frothingham a constitutionally possible and needed
exception. The basis was provided by the overwhelming importance which our society places on the neutrality of the Government
in religious matters. The need arose because of Congress' failure
to grant standing to challenge congressional appropriations which,
in part, are given to non-secular institutions, and thus may violate
the mandate of neutrality between church and state. Therefore, it
is submitted, as Mr. Justice Fortas contends in his concurring
opinion in Flast,that:
[T]here is no reason to suggest, and no basis in the logic of this
decision for implying, that there may be other types of congressional expenditures which may be attacked by a litigant
solely on the basis of his status as a taxpayer.7 9

Charles B. Baumer '69
77
78

at 106.
The Honorable Sam Ervin Jr. (D-N.C.) has stated that

Id.

church-state provisions o

"...

the

our Constitution are a fundamental

covenant of Government, so fundamental that every citizen has an
interest in their enforcement and so fundamental that the country
will want the Court to settle issues of this kind. . . ." Hearings on

S. 2907, supra note 40, at 6.
79

392 U.S. 83, 115 (1968).

